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A SYNTHESIS AND A PROPOSAL
FOR REFORM OF THE EMPLOYMENT
AT-WILL DOCTRINE
ROBERT

M.

BASTRESS*

Representing a client who seeks relief for an employment discharge is a lot like playing bingo: you hope the client calls out
facts that permit you to maneuver the case into the right squares
of forbidden employer motive or conduct in order to win a prize.
The traditional doctrine of at-will employment,' which gives an
employer the right to fire an employee at any time for any reason
or for no reason, has now been qualified in so many ways that
only bad luck prevents an unjustly discharged employee from fit* Professor of Law, West Virginia University. B.A., Wesleyan University, 1971; J.D., Vanderbilt University, 1974; LL.M., Temple University, 1978. Portions of Part I of this article are adapted
from Section I of R. BAsrEss, E. SPIR, AN F. RoiLs, LITIGATING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE iN WEsT
VmGINA (1986), published by Professional Education Systems, Eau Claire, Wisconsin. The author
extends his appreciation to the publisher for its permission to draw on that text.
1. "Under the law governing the relation of master and servant, an employment unaffected
by contractual or statutory provisions to the contrary, may be terminated with or without cause, at
the will of either party." Bell v. South Penn Natural Gas Co., 135 W. Va. 25, 62 S.E.2d 285 (1950).
The doctrine has been traced to H. WOOD, A TREATIsE ON THE LAw oF MAsT R AND SERVANT §
134 (st ed. 1877):
A hiring at so much a day, week, month, or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite
hiring, and no presumption attaches, that it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed
[I]t is an indefinite hiring and is terminable
for whatever time the party may serve ....
at the will of either party, and in this respect there is no distinction between domestic and
other servants.
The harshness of the rule is well documented in the reporters. E.g., Hablas v. Armour & Co.,
270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959) (at-will employee terminated after 43 years of service for no good reason
not permitted to recover damages or recoup his contributions to the pension fund); Clarke v. Atlantic
Stevedoring Co., 163 F. 423 (E.D. N.Y. 1908) (black stevedores discharged to make jobs available
for whites did not have cause of action); Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171
(1960) (employee, who was advised by management that it was her duty to be available for jury
service and was then discharged for serving on jury, had no cause of action).
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ting his termination into squares that could provide relief. It is

the employer's poor luck if the employee's allegations fall into a
category that allows tort damages, including emotional distress and
punitive damages, rather than one that permits only make-whole,
equitable relief.2 This pattern of haphazardly drawn squares of
actionable discharges and available damages resembles those occasions in the common law when courts have produced a variety
of exceptions, limitations, and factual manipulations to avoid a
disfavored doctrine. Such maneuverings have invariably presaged
the complete replacement of that doctrine with a simpler and fairer
standard better suited to modern conditions. We now stand at that
moment when the at-will rule should be discarded and major reform implemented.
The inroads on the at-will employment doctrine have been amply developed in numerous articles and books.3 This article retraces

2. See, e.g., Waks & Schwartz, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Workplace, 4 LAD. &
EMs'. L. NEwsL. 27, 27 (May 1987):

A recent survey of jury verdicts in wrongful discharge cases in California indicates that the
average total verdict in 1986 was approximately $251,000 (this average excludes two jury
awards that exceeded one million dollars). California certainly is not the only state where
large jury awards have become an employer's nightmare. For example, a Colorado jury
awarded a single plaintiff over $15 million in damages in a wrongful discharge case, see
Rawson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 530 F. Supp. 776 (D. Colo. 1982), and a Florida jury
awarded $3.5 million in damages ($2.5 million in punitive damages) against Southern Bell
in a single plaintiff race discrimination case. . . . More modest verdicts, such as the Mississippi jury award of over $350,000 in an individual case of age discrimination, see Guthrie
v. J.C. Penney Co., 803 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1986), are no less cause for concern in assessing
the risks of a litigated solution.
See also, e.g., Flanigan v. Prudential Fed. Say. & L., 720 P.2d 257 (Mont. 1986) ($1.5 million verdict,
including $1.3 million in punitive damages and $100,000 for emotional distress, awarded to discharged
bank teller); Gardner v. Charles Schwab & Co., No. 842297 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 14, 1987) ($742,400
award, including $500,000 for emotional distress); O'Dell v. Dasabe, Daily Lab. Rep. A-6 (Idaho
June 18, 1987) ($1.4 million verdict, including $1 million in punitive damages).
When the million dollar verdicts were added into the California survey that Waks and Schwartz
referred to, the pool of judgments produced an average verdict of $424,527. O'Dell, Daily Labor
Rep. A-4 (Feb. 24, 1987). Of those cases in -which plaintiffs were awarded punitive damages, those
damages by themselves averaged $494,517. Id. But, of all discharge actions filed, "most cases are
settled out of court. . .for $5,000 or less." Id.
3. E.g., L. LARsoN & P. BOROWSKY, UNJUsT DismSSAL (1987); Abrahams & Noland, Toward
a Theory of 'Just Cause' in Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 DuKE L.J. 594; Baxter & Wohl, A
Special Update: Wrongful Termination Tort Claims, 11 EMPLoYEn REL. L.J. 124 (1985); Blackburn,
Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of Employment at Will, 17 Aid. Bus.
L.J. 467 (1980); Blades, Employment at Will v. IndividualFreedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise
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those inroads only to synthesize them to the extent needed to sub-

stantiate its basic themes and identify recent developments.
Accordingly, Part I explores the variety of strategies courts and
legislatures have used to qualify the at-will doctrine. References

are made to statutory and constitutional restrictions on employer
discretion, common law tort actions for dismissals in violation of
public policy, and various contract-based tactics in which courts
have found some sort of just cause protection for employees. Part
II then argues that those strategies establish a basis for rejecting

the at-will doctrine and creating a new standard that achieves fair
treatment for employees, and meets employees' crucial interests in
job security, yet accounts for legitimate employer concerns. Fi-

nally, Part III proposes what that new standard should look like.
I.

A.

LIMITS ON THE AT-WiLL DOCTRINE

Statutory Restrictions

Modern regulatory laws provided the first major limits on employers' ability to hire and fire at-will. After decades of bitter,
and sometimes violent, struggles, the New Deal Era produced labor-management statutes that guaranteed workers the right to or-

of Employer Power, 67 CoLum. L. REv. 1404 (1967); Gillette, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing: Are Employers the Insurers of the Eighties?, 11 EMPLOYEES REL. L.J. 438 (1985);
Gould, The Rights of Individual Workers, CENTER MAG. 2 (July/Aug. 1984); Hermann & Sor, Property Rights in One's Job: The Case for Limiting Employment-at-Will, 24 Am. L. REv. 763 (1982);
Krauskopf, Employment Discharge: Survey and Critique of the Modern Employment-at-Will Rule,
51 U. Mo. KAN. Crry L. REv. 189 (1983); Mallor, DiscriminatoryDischarge and the Emerging Common Law of Wrongful Discharge, 28 ARiZ. L. REv. 651 (1986); Marrinan, Employment At-Will:
Pandora'sBox May Have an Attractive Cover, 7 HAnm L. REv. 155 (1984); Murg & Scharman,
Employment at Will: Do Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule, 23 B.C.L. REv. 319 (1982); Peck, Unjust
Dischargesfrom Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 Omo ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Pierce,
Mann, & Roberts, Employee Termination at Will: A PrincipledApproach, 28 VLL. L. REv. 1 (1982);
Platt, Rethinking the Right of Employers to Terminate At-Will Employees, 15 J. MARSHALL L. REv.

633 (1982); Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual Employees: Fair
Representation and Employment at Will, 52 FoaDwm L. REv. 1082 (1984); Summers, Individual
Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 'VA. L. REv. 481 (1976); Note, Protecting
Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARv. L. Rnv. 1931
(1983); Note, Defining Public Policy in at Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REv. 153 (1981); Comment,
Cook v. Heck's: Erosion of Employment at Will in West Virginia, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 379 (1987);
Annotations, 44 A.L.R.4TH 1131, 35 A.LR.4TH 691, 9 A.LR.4TH 329.
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ganize, form unions, and collectively bargain. 4 Protection or
employees from retaliatory discharge for their organizing and union activities provided the keystone for this legislation and marked
a dramatic departure from the laissez faire property notions that
had previously assured the employer's right to do with his business
what he wanted.5 In addition, the development of strong labor
unions led to the inclusion in nearly all collective bargaining agreements of provisions requiring employers to show just cause for
any employee termination. Thus, that sector of the national workforce covered by collectively bargained contracts is not affected
6
by the at-will doctrine.
Employer discretion was further eroded with the passage in the
1960's of federal and state fair employment laws, such as Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 7 and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act.8 These statutes, of course, prohibited employers
from discharging workers because of a bias based on race, gender,
national origin, religion, or age. Since then, federal, state, and
municipal laws covering assorted groups of employers have added
discrimination based on handicap, blindness, alienage, wage garnishment, veteran's status, ancestry, and sexual preference to the
list of prohibited animi.9
In another set of limitations, federal and state laws regulating
the workplace frequently include provisions protecting employees
from retaliatory discharge for invoking their rights under the act.

4. E.g., National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act of 1935), § 1, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982)
[hereinafter N.L.R.A.].
5. See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
6. Employees who work under collective bargaining agreements have, however, invoked the

common law tort theories that qualify at-will employment and that are described in Sections I-B and
-C, infra. Such efforts by unionized employees raise a substantial preemption issue under the N.L.R.A.

See generally Note, NLRA Preemption of State Wrongful Discharge Claims, 34 HASTMOs L.J. 635
(1983). The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari on the issue. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic

Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 226 (1987).
7. 42 U.S.C. 88 2000e to -17 (1982).
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982).
9. E.g., Rehabilitation Act of 1973, §§ 503-04, 29 U.S.C. §§ 793-94 (1982) (handicap discrimination); West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-3 & 5-11-9 (1987) (discrimination

based on "race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, age, blindness or handicap"); D.C.
CODE ANN § 1-2512(a) (1987) (discrimination based on "sexual orientation").
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Examples include statutes concerning fair employment practices, 10

workers' compensation," wages and hours, 2 occupational safety, 3
and employee pensions.

4

More recently, Congress and state leg-

islatures have also included in general regulatory laws provisions
prohibiting employer retaliation against persons who initiate or
participate in proceedings under the act. These statutes relate to

such diverse subjects as strip mining, air pollution, and energy.'Finally, statutes concerning government employment have substantially limited the at-will discretion of public employers. In par-

ticular, civil service 6 and teacher tenure laws 17 typically provide
that permanent or tenured employees cannot be terminated without
just cause.
The above statutes, especially the fair employment laws, take
on particular significance because of their judicial interpretation.
Under the analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 8 which

has been applied generally to anti-discrimination laws, the discharged employee-plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by showing: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he is qualified

for the position in question and performed it capably; (3) he was
dismissed; (4) and the employer either sought a replacement of

similar qualifications or replaced him with an individual having
similar qualifications. ' 9 In effect, the Supreme Court has stated
10. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1982); W. VA. CODE § 5-119(i) (1987).
11. W. VA. CODE § 23-5A-1 (1985).
12. Fair Labor Standards Act, § 1, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1982).
13. Occupational Safety and Health Act, § 11, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1982); Mine Safety and
Health Act, § 2, 30 U.S.C. § 801 (1982); Railway Safety Act, § 212, 45 U.S.C. § 441 (1982).
14. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, § 401, 29 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982).
15. E.g., Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, § 401, 30 U.S.C. § 1231 (1982); Clean
Air Act, § 322, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1982); Energy Reorganization Act, § 210, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1982).
16. E.g., Civil Service Reform Act, § 101, 5 U.S.C. § 3101 (1982); W. VA. CODE § 29-6-15
(1986).
17. E.g., W. VA. CODE § 18A-2-8 (1984).
18. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
19. As McDonnell Douglas itself recognized, this set of objective factors is not the only means
for establishing a prima facie case. McDonnellDouglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13. For example, a discharged
employee-plaintiff could also put the burden of coming forward on the defendant by showing that,
under circumstances similar to the plaintiff's, an individual of a different race or sex was retained.
E.g., EEOC v. Brown & Root, Inc., 688 F.2d 338, 340 (5th Cir. 1982); Johnson v. Bunny Bread
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that the plaintiff's burden in the prima facie case is to present
facts that create an inference of discrimination. 20 The model is
designed to facilitate that showing in order to force the employer,
the party with control over the primary sources of evidence, to
come forward. The employer must respond to the plaintiff's prima
facie showing with some legitimate business purpose. The plaintiff
then has an opportunity to show the defendant's proffered rationale is a pretext. Typically, that forces the proof in the case to
an assessment of both the weight of the employer's reason and
whether it was supported by the facts. If the employer does not

have a legitimate business purpose or lacks an evidentiary basis
for his purpose (i.e., if the discharge lacked "just cause," then
the employer runs a substantial risk of being found in violation
of the particular statute). Thus, fair employment litigation effects
a practical imposition of a just cause requirement. That possibility,

however, extends only to employees who can claim membership
in some protected class.
Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1253 (8th Cir. 1981); Turner v. Texas Instruments, 555 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th
Cir. 1977) overruled on other grounds, Burdine v. Texas Dep't of Commun. Affairs, 647 F.2d 513
(5th Cir. 1981).
20. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); Texas Dep't. of Commun. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
Presumably, that was thrust of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeal's decision in Conaway
v. Eastern Ass'n Coal Corp., 358 S.E.2d 423 (W. Va 1986). The court there proposed a "general
test" for employment discrimination cases:
(1) That the plaintiff is a member of a protected class.
(2) That the employer made an adverse decision concerning the plaintiff.
(3) But for the plaintiff's protected status, the adverse decision would not have been made.
Id. at 429. While use of the "but for" language could lead to confusion, given its implication that
direct proof of causation might be required in the prima facie case, the court's elaboration of its test
prevents that conflict with the McDonnell Douglas line of cases and squares it with the federal decisional law:
Direct proof, however, is not required. What is required of the plaintiff is to show some
evidence which would sufficiently link the employer's decision and the plaintiff's status as
a member of a protected class so as to give rise to an inference that the employment decision
was based on an illegal discriminatorycriterion.
Id. at 429-30 (emphasis added). A footnote from the Court reinforces the point:
This test is no great feat of judicial construction, but merely is proof that it takes a court
three sentences to say what the layman could say as well in one. A layman would say: "I
was - (fired,, demoted, etc.) because I was - (too old, black, a woman, etc.)." If
the plaintiff can offer proof of this one sentence, he has a prima facie case, otherwise no.
Id. at 429 n.5. Thus, a showing by the plaintiff that would lead an individual to infer there was
something "fishy" in the employment decision requires the employer to come forward with some
rationale to explain it. The proof then proceeds to assess the validity of that rationale.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss2/2
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ConstitutionalRestrictions

The relevance of federal and state constitutions to employment
is largely confined to public sector jobs. In that context, however,
recent constitutional law developments have had a substantial impact and have paralleled the developments taking place in the common law.
Prevailing doctrine through the nineteenth and most of the
twentieth centuries viewed public employment as a "privilege,"
which could be withdrawn without limitation by the government.
Thus, public employees could be discharged for exercising their
right to speak freely or to join an organization. 2 1 This perception,
however, has now been authoritatively rejected. 22 Public employees, even those engaged on an at-will basis, cannot be discharged
for any reason that penalizes them for their exercise of a constitutional right. 23 The first amendment also prohibits spoils systems
and discharge decisions based upon employees' political affiliations, at least for the vast majority of public jobs. 24 In addition,
governmental entities cannot constitutionally discharge employees
because of some invidious animus, such as race, gender, national
origin, religion, or (in some cases) alienage. 25 That is, the Constitution clearly places substantive limits on public employers' discharge decisions.
Many decisions premised on procedural due process grounds
have also been generous in locating property interests for public

21. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, aff'd, 342 U.S. 951 (1952), McAuliffe
v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892) (Holmes, J.) ("The petitioner
may have a constititional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman").
22. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 595 (1967). See generally Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
23. E.g., Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979); Mt. Healthy City
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Pickering
v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
24. E.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (hiring authority must demonstrate that "party
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved");
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
25. E.g., Davis v. Passman, 439 U.S. 1113 (1979) (recognizing claim for sex discrimination in
congressional office); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (striking down citizenship requirement
for state civil service). But cf. e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (state may limit public
school teaching jobs to citizens because of teachers' special functions).
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employees that would entitle them to continued employment upon
satisfactory performance and to a hearing upon attempted termination. These results have been obtained not only in cases involving explicit tenure or civil service systems, but also when the
employee's interests must be inferred from general statutes, regulations, governmental practices, institutional practices, and personnel policies. 26
C.

The Public Policy Tort
The most widely-adopted common law exception to the at-will
doctrine imposes liability on an employer who discharges a worker
for reasons that contravene a substantial public policy. To date,
the cases have invariably involved employer retaliation for some
action taken by the employee. Not surprisingly, then, the tort has
also been referred to as "retaliatory discharge" as well as "wrongful discharge." Subsection 1, below, categorizes the cases according to the nature of the employee's conduct found to be protected
from employer retaliation. Subsection 2 discusses how courts have
determined whether the employer's action implicated some "substantial public policy"; that is, what makes a policy a "public
policy?"
1. Protected Employee Conduct
The decisions fall into four categories of employee conduct protected from employer retaliation. Those categories, which are not
wholly distinct, include: (a) employee exercise of a valuable right;
(b) employee performance of a valuable public service; (c) employee exposure of, or complaints about, employer wrongdoing;
and (d) employee refusal to engage in unlawful or unethical conduct. They are addressed below in that order.
(a) Employee Exercise of a Valuable Right. At present, most
of the cases involve efforts by employees to invoke provisions of
26. E.g., Perry, 408 U.S. 593; Major v. DeFrench, 169 W. Va. 241, 286 S.E.2d 688 (1982);
State ex rel. McLendon v. Morton, 162 W. Va. 431, 249 S.E.2d 919 (1978). But see Bishop v. Wood,
426 U.S. 341 (1976).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss2/2

8

Bastress: A Synthesis and a Proposal for Reform of the Employment At-Will D

1987]

THE EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL DOCTRINE

statutes designed to protect employees in the workplace or in their
relations with employers. Courts have found employers liable for

retaliatory discharges of employees for engaging in the following
activities: filing workers' compensation claims; 27 efforts to enforce
or invoke occupational safety laws; 28 exercise of rights under labor

relations laws; 29 invoking rights under fair employment laws;30 and
31
invoking privacy rights in refusing to take a lie detector test.

In addition to protecting statutorily created employment rights,
some courts have extended the public policy concept to include

employee exercise of constitutional rights. In the most significant
decision to date, Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 32 the Third

Circuit Court of Appeals applying Pennsylvania law concluded that
an employee stated a claim for relief in alleging that he was ter-

minated for refusing to lobby the state legislature on the employer's behalf (regarding a proposed no-fault law) and for
generally taking political stands contrary to those taken by the

employer. "[T]he protection of an employee's freedom of political
expression would appear to involve no less compelling a societal

interest than the fulfillment of jury service or the filing of a work-

27. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.
2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton v. Central Ind.
Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973), 63 A.L.R.3D 973 (1973); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69
Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 165 W. Va. 305,
270 S.E.2d 178 (1980); Annotation, Recovery forDischargefrom Employment in Retaliationfor Filing
Workers' Compensation Claim, 32 A.L.R.4r 1221 (1984).
28. Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982); Cloutier v. Great
Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981). See also Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat
Serv., 653 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1981) (filing personal injury claim against employer); Stanley v. Sewell
Coal Co., 169 W. Va. 72, 285 S.E.2d 679 (1981).
29. Stepanischen v. Merchants Dispatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1983); Cleary
v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal.
App. 3d 69, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1970); McClung v. Marion County Comm'n 360 S.E.2d 221 (W. Va.
1987) (minimum wage and minimum hours law).
30. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (contract theory),
as limited by Cloutier, 121 N.H. at 920, 436 A.2d at 1143. See also Hovey v. Lutheran Medical
Center, 516 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. N.Y. 1981) (facts may have allowed claims under ADEA and ERISA).
But see Guevera v. K-Mart Corp., 629 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D. W. Va. 1986) (victim of discrimination
protected by state Human Rights Act was limited to claim under that statute).
31. Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3rd Cir. 1979); CordIe v. General
Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111 (W. Va. 1984); State v. Community Distrib. Inc., 64 N.J. 479,
317 A.2d 697 (1974). But see Smith v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 370 So. 2d 283 (Ala. 1979);
Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977).
32. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
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er's compensation claim." ' 33 The Oregon Supreme Court has also

accorded a cause of action to a discharged employee invoking the
34
state constitution's free speech provision.
Moreover, many of the retaliatory discharge cases that have
drawn support from legislative policy judgments could be reformulated as implementing protections from private sector employers' abuse of their employees' constitutional rights. For example,
a discharge for filing a workmen's compensation claim could also
be seen as retaliation against a worker for exercising his right to
petition the government for redress of grievances," 5 and the firing
of whistleblowers discriminates against them for their exercise of
36
free speech.

These decisions recognize that private employers can exert enormous leverage over their workers because they fear losing their
jobs. Many employees feel a greater threat to their personal liberties from insensitive or overbearing employers than from government officials whose "state actions" are constrained by the Bill
37
of Rights and the fourteenth amendment.

33. Id. at 899.

34. Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, Inc., 297 Or. 10, 681 P.2d 114 (1984); DeBleecker v. Montgomery County, 292 Md. 498, 438 A.2d 1348 (1982); Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 431
N.E.2d 908 (1982) (dicta recognizing protection of employees' right of privacy); Slohoda v. United
Parcel Serv., 193 N.J. Super. 586, 475 A.2d 618 (1984) (same); McClung, 360 S.E.2d at 227 (constitutional provisions guaranteeing rights to petition for redress of grievances and access to the courts
create a substantial public policy); Cordle, 325 S.E.2d at 115-17 (constitutional principles of privacy
and due process imbued finding of public policy violation); Part B, supra. See generally L. LAzsoN
& P. BOROWSKY, UNrJUST DISissAL § 6.11 (1987); Carroll, Protecting Private Employees' Freedom
of PoliticalSpeech, 18 HARv. J. oN LEGIs. 35 (1981); Halbert, The FirstAmendment in the Workplace:
An Analysis and Callfor Reform, 17 S-roN HAIL 42 (1987); Note, Free Speech, the PrivateEmployee,
and State Constitutions, 91 YALE L.J. 522 (1982).
35. See McClung, 360 S.E.2d 221.
36. Sed generally Halbert, supra note 34. Note, Protectingthe Private Sector at Will Employee
Who "Blows the Whistle". A Cause of Action Based upon Determinants of PublicPolicy, 1977 Wis.
L. Ray. 777.
37. In addition to employer impositions on employees' constitutional rights, unions can interfere
with members' rights. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (public employee
union members could not, upon pain of losing their jobs, be forced to support union political activity
with which they disagreed); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (NLRA, § 9's
grant of exclusive representation to union would violate constitution if exercised by a union practicing
race discrimination; therefore union owes employees a duty of fair representation); Mitchell v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 196 Cal. App. 2d 796, 16 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1961) (society's interest
in free speech and economic power of labor unions meant public policy was violated if the union
disciplined members for engaging in speech that was contrary to the union's official position).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss2/2
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(b) Employee Performance of a Valuable Public Service. In
some ways, each of the categories listed here includes instances of
employees engaged in activities valuable to the public. Certainly,
the "whistleblowers" discussed below38 provide the public with a
substantial benefit, as would the refusal of employees to participate in criminal activities.3 9 There are, however, a handful of cases
in which the retaliated-against activities of the employee cannot
be separately categorized. Those instances have involved the employee's completion of a specific duty arising out of citizenship
and shared by the citizenry generally. Illustrative decisions include
discharges of employees because they had served on a jury, 40 supplied information to police about a fellow employee's suspected
crime, 4' or testified before a grand jury.42
(c) Employee Exposure of, or Complaints About, Employer

Wrongdoing. Under this branch of the tort, employees establish
a claim for relief if they show they were discharged because they
tried in good faith to protect the public interest by disclosing in-

formation, or by urging in-house reform, regarding their employer's violation of a law or regulation.
Harless v. First National Bank43 is a leading case. Harless, the
manager of a bank's consumer credit department, was permitted
recovery after he proved he was fired because of his efforts to

force the bank's compliance with consumer credit laws. Of similar
import were decisions granting relief, or recognizing a claim for
relief, for employees who were discharged for complaining about
procedures for handling radioactive cobalt in violation of Nuclear
Regulatory Commission regulations, 44 reporting to management
38. See infra text accompanying notes 43-46.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 47-50.
40. Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978); Nees v.
Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975). See also Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act, § 6, 28
U.S.C. § 1875 (1982) (prohibiting discharge for serving on a federal jury).
41. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
42. Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983). See also Petermann v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (holding employer liable
for discharging an employee after he refused to falsely testify before a legislative committee).
43. Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978).
44. Wheeler v. Caterpillar, Inc., 108 Ill. 2d 502, 485 N.E.2d 372 (1985). The Wheeler Court
did not require as an element of the plaintiff's claim that he prove he had complained to the regulatory
authorities.
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discrepancies of a possibly criminal nature in the corporation's
financial records and attempting to ensure company compliance
with the law, 45 complaining of substandard materials and underweight products and trying to force compliance with labeling and

licensing statutes .46
(d) Employee Refusal to Engage in Unlawful or Unethical Conduct. Several decisions have recognized a cause of action against
employers by former employees who were discharged for their refusal to perform prohibited acts. These cases reflect both a desire
to sustain the public policy upon which the substantive prohibition
is based and a judgment that workers should not be forced to
choose between committing a crime (or other actionable wrong)
and their jobs. Thus, courts have upheld employees' claims of
wrongful discharge for refusing to participate in a scheme to fix
47
gasoline prices in violation of federal and state antitrust laws,
commit perjury in legislative hearings concerning the employer's

business, 48 illegally adjust sampling results for state pollution reports, 49 and violate an explicit provision of the state code of ethical

conduct regulating plaintiff's profession (pharmacy)50
45. Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., II1 Ill. App. 3d 502, 444 N.E.2d 588 (1982) aff'd, 143
Ill. App. 3d 1, 493 N.E.2d 616 (1986).
46. Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980). But see Cain
v. Kansas Corp. Comm., 9 Kan. App. 2d 100, 673 P.2d 451 (1983) (no public policy found in
employee's personal opinion in his advocacy for consumers and investors and criticism of the employercommission); Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1980) (no public policy implicated by employee
allegedly terminated for complaining to supervisors about inadequacy of company's service to consumers); Geary v, United States Steel, 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974) (employee's charges of
retaliation for his objections to the marketing of potentially defective steel pipes did not manifest a
public policy in the absence of any specific statutory violation by the employer).
47. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980).
48. Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
49. Trombetta v. Detroit, T. & I. R.R., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978). The court
ruled, however, that the trial court properly granted the employer's motion for summary judgment
because the plaintiff failed to offer rebuttal evidence to the employer's affidavits.
50. Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 183 N.J. Super. 153, 443 A.2d 728 (1982). But see Pierce
v. Ortho Phrm. Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (no violation of a clear public policy when
physician-employee was terminated for refusing to do work she contended, without explicit support
in a code or regulation, was medically unethical); Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 412
Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982) (no claim for relief for employee allegedly discharged for his
refusal to violate the Code of Ethics of the Institute of Internal Auditors or the state's regulation
governing public utilities' accounting procedures because the former did not establish a public policy
and the latter was not directed at conferring rights on employees).
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The Identification of Substantial Public Policies

There is a spectrum of opinions regarding the proper bases for
identifying "public policies" that limit employer discretion in the

discharge of employees. In its narrowest form, public policy must
be derived from clear and specific legislation designed to protect

employees in their jobs. Furthermore, to state a claim the plaintiff
must show the employer's actions contravened some specific provision of that legislation. 5' Under this standard, courts assume very

little discretion in identifying public policy and only minimally
intrude on employer perogatives. In moving along the spectrum
toward a more expansive view of public policy, courts have taken

one or more of the following steps:
(1) Extended the kinds of state interests to be vindicated from only those protecting workers to include general concerns regarding public health, safety,
2
welfare, morals, etc.;1 and

(2) Derived public policies not only from specific legislative provisions but also
3
from broadly stated legislative goals; and
(3) Expanded the sources for identifying public policies beyond those stated
in legislation to include administrative regulations and executive rules, codes
of ethics of professional organizations, constitutional provisions, and judicial
decisions .54

Within any jurisdiction, the clearer the basis for the claimed policy, the more likely a court will be to conclude it is a public policy
51. See Geary, 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174. Compare Kalman, 183 N.J. Super. 153, 443 A.2d
728 (specific provisions of Code of Ethics for pharmacists raised public policy), with Pierce, 84 N.J.
58, 417 A.2d 505 (vague theories of medical ethics did not implicate public policy); and compare
Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981) (Maryland recognizes abusive
discharge tort but complaint failed to state such a claim because it did not "articulate a sufficiently
clear mandate of public policy") with Adler v. American Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572 (D. Md.
1982) (after amending complaint, plaintiff stated claim for relief by meeting state court's standard
and enumerating specific violations of various bribery, anti-corruption, and antitrust laws).
52. E.g., Sheets, 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (food and drug labeling and licensing laws);
Petrik, 111 Ili. App. 3d 502, 444 N.E.2d 588 (corporate accounting laws); Harless, 162 W. Va. 116,
246 S.E.2d 270 (consumer credit laws).
53. See Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876; Cordle, 325 S.E.2d 111.
54. E.g., Novosel, 721 F.2d 894 (constitutional protections of freedom of speech) (applying
Pennsylvania law); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985);
Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986); Parnar v. American
Hotels, 652 P.2d 625 (Hawaii 1982); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d
1081 (1984); Cordle, 325 S.E.2d Ill. See also Yoho v. Triangle PWC, Inc., 336 S.E.2d 204 (%V.Va.
1985).
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that limits employer discretion. And courts are most likely to reach
that conclusion if the policy derives from legislation.
Of these three lines of expansion, the most significant is the
last; it is the most open-ended, freeing courts to promote policies
the legislature has not yet addressed. The states that have recognized nonlegislative sources of public policy have produced a
variety of approaches for identifying the kinds of policies to be
protected.
Oregon, for example, maintains two categories of substantial
public policies limiting employer discretion. 55 The first precludes
employers from discharging workers who have fulfilled a societal
obligation created by statutory or constitutional provisions. Such
obligations include service on a jury56 and refusal to join in defamatory accusations .57 The second category creates a cause of
action for an employee who is discharged for "pursuing a right
related to his role as an employee and the right is one of important
public interest indicated by constitutional and statutory provisions
and case-law." ' 58 Thus, in Brown v. Transcon Lines, 9 the Oregon
Supreme Court held that an employee fired for filing a workers'
compensation claim had a wrongful discharge remedy. In contrast,
the court refused to find a claim for relief in Campbell v. Ford
Industries,60 where the employee, who was also a stockholder, was
fired in retaliation for exercising his statutory right as a stockholder to inspect corporate records. The relevant statute's primary
purpose was to protect private and proprietary interests rather than
public interests. Hence, "[p]laintiff was discharged for exercising
a private statutory right not of great importance to society." 61 That
is, "[t]he statutory right pursued in Brown related directly to the
plaintiff's role as an employee. .

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

.

. In Campbell, the statutory

Delaney, 297 Or. at 15-16, 681 P.2d at 117-18.
Nees, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512.
Delaney, 297 Or. 10, 681 P.2d 114.
Id. at 16, 681 P.2d at 118.
Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978).
Campbell v. Ford Indus., 274 Or. 243, 546 P.2d 141 (1976).
Delaney, 297 Or. at 15, 681 P.2d at 117.
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right pursued by plaintiff related to plaintiff, not in his role as
6' 2
an employee, but in his role as a stockholder.
West Virginia has adopted a broader standard. It finds the
sources of public policy to be, "among others, our federal and
state constitutions, our public statutes, our judicial decisions, the
applicable principles of the common law, the acknowledged prevailing concepts of the federal and state governments relating to
and affecting the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the

people ....

163

On one occasion, in Yoho v. Triangle PWC, Inc.,64

the West Virginia court stated that standard applies to matters in
which "there is a virtual unanimity of opinion. ' 65 Thus, any "issue which is fairly debatable or controversial in nature is one for
the legislature and not for [the courts]. '"66 Yet in that same opinion, the court quoted with approval a broad definition of public
policy as 'that principle of law under which freedom of contract
or private dealings are restricted by law for the good of the community - the public good."' 67 In the subsequent, unanimous decision in McClung, the court made no reference to the degree of
consensus about the policy.68 Presumably, a general consensus prevails that all of the state's Bill of Rights provisions identify and
promote important public policies. And once the legislature addresses and enacts legislation designed to protect the public, that
subject must also be conceded to be a substantial public policy.
Thus, Yoho's "virtual unanimity" language, if it persists at all,

62. Id. at 16, 681 P.2d at 118.
63. Cordle, 325 S.E.2d at 114 (quoting Allen v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 131 N.J.L. 475,
37 A.2d 37 (1944)).
64. Yoho, 336 S.E.2d 204.
65. Id. at 209 (quoting Mamlin v. Genoe, 340 Pa. 320, 325, 17 A.2d 407, 409 (1941)).
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting Higgins v. McFarland, 196 Va. 889, 894, 86 S.E.2d 168, 172 (1955)). Yoho's
"virtually unanimous" vs. "fairly debatable" distinction must also be read in the context of a holding
refusing to find a public policy. One could certainly question, too, whether the recognition in Cordle,
325 S.E.2d 111, of the public policy against lie detector usage by employers satisfied the Yoho stan-

dard. That is especially so given Cordle'sreliance on emerging, but not yet clearly delineated, notions
of common law and constitutional rights of privacy.
68. McClung, 360 S.E.2d at 226-27. McClung concluded that an employee's termination for
filing a state wage claim action violated the public policies in the statute and in the state constitutional
provisions creating a right to petition the government for redress of grievances and to have the courts
of the state open to him.
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would seem to impose few restrictions on cases that invoke constitutional or statutory protections as the source of the applicable
public policy.

Other states have also adopted expansive standards. Arizona
sees a public policy established in those pronouncements of the
state's founders, legislature, and courts having a "singularly public
purpose" as opposed to those that are "merely private or proprietary." ' 69 And Illinois has defined a clearly mandated public

policy as one that "strikes at the heart of a citizen's social rights,
70
duties, and responsibilities."
The recognition of constitutional provisions as a source of limitation on private employers could provide a most significant expansion, particularly through protection of employees who promote
controversial or unpopular causes. 7' In addition, employees' rights
of privacy could also add a significant limitation on employers'
abilities to discharge employees for their off-duty activities.72
69. Public policy is usually defined by the political branches of government. Something
'against public policy' is something that the Legislature has forbidden. But the Legislature
is not the only source of such policy. In common-law jurisdictions the courts, too, have
been sources of law, always subject to legislative correction, and with progressively less
freedom as legislation occupies a given field...
[ We believe that reliance on prior judicial decisions, as part of the body of applicable
common law, is appropriate, although. . . 'courts should proceed cautiously if called upon
to declare public policy absent some prior legislative or judicial expression on the subject.'
Thus, we will look to the pronouncements of our founders, our legislature, and our
courts to discern the public policy of the state.
All such pronouncements, however" will not provide the basis for a Claim of wrongful
discharge. Only those which have a singularly public purpose will have such force ...
Where the interest involved is merely private or proprietary, the exception does not apply.
Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. at 379, 710 P.2d at 1033-34.
70. Palmateer, 85 Ill.
2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876; Novosel, 721 F.2d at 899.
71. Of course, statutes already provide a large measure of protection to employees that is
analogous to that afforded by constitutional law. Fair employment laws, for example, prohibit various
forms of invidious employer discrimination. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. In addition,
the N.R.L.A., §§ 7-8, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-58, protects employees from retaliation for their participation
in concerted "activities," which encompasses the rights of association and advocacy in the employment
context. See, e.g., NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822 (1984); Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S.
556 (1978). Many statutes also prohibit employer retaliation against employees who exercise their right
to petition for redress of grievances through pursuit of statutory rights. See, supra notes 10-15 and
accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Cort, 385 Mass. 300, 431 N.E.2d 908; Slohoda, 193 N.J. Super. 586, 475 A.2d
618; Cordle, 325 S.E.2d 111; Golden v. Board of Educ., 169 W. Va. 63, 285 S.E.2d 665 (1981). It
would not be difficult to imagine cases arising in which, for example, an employee is discharged for
having an abortion or for bearing or fathering a child out of wedlock.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss2/2
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Breach of Contract and Breach of the Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing

In addition to the creation of a retaliatory discharge tort action,
courts have liberally construed traditional contract and related
doctrines to limit the harshness of the at-will rule. These developments have taken several forms.
First, courts have been willing to accept oral promises of job
security, identifying exceptions to the Statute of Frauds, which
ordinarily renders unenforceable oral contracts that are not to be
performed within one year. 73 Naturally, when no termination date
has been specified in the oral agreement, an employee claiming he
was promised a job for as long as his performance was satisfactory
would anticipate a tenure exceeding one year. Nevertheless, such
contracts have been upheld through application of any one of three
theories. First, and most broadly, several courts have found that
so long as the contract can be performed within one year, it is
outside the Statute of Fraud's purview. Thus, any contract with
a contingency that could terminate the agreement at any time would
not have to be in writing.7 4 At-will employment contracts necessarily include two such contingencies: the employee may be fired,
or he may leave before the year is out. 75 Second, some employees
have enforced an employer's oral promises by proving they acted
in reliance on the promises. Generally, a promise that the promisor

73. E.g., W. VA. CODE § 55-1-1 (1981).
74. E.g., Hodge v. Evans Finance Corp., 823 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (indefinite employment
contracts fall outside the Statute of Frauds because they are capable of being performed within a
year); Frazier v. Colonial Williamsburg Found., 574 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Va. 1983); White Lighting
Co. v. Wolfson, 62 Cal. 2d 336, 438 P.2d 345, 66 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1968); Plumlee v. Poag, 150 Cal.
App. 3d 541, 198 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1984); Thompson v. Stuckey, 300 S.E.2d 295 (W.Va. 1983). The
California Supreme Court has recently granted review in two cases that involve the application of
the Statute of Frauds to oral employment contracts. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 174 Cal. App.
3d 282, 219 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1985), rev. granted, Cal. 3d , 712 P.2d 891, 222 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1986);
Santa Monica Hosp. v. Superior Court, 182 Cal. App. 3d 878, 218 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1985), rev. granted,
Cal. 3d, 711 P.2d 520, 222 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1986).
75. On that basis, the cases cited in note 74 found the Statute did not bar enforcement of an
oral promise of job security. A third contingency also would apply to any personal services contract
and has been relied upon by some couts to circumvent the Statute of Frauds. That is, the employee
could die, which most surely would terminate the agreement. See Hodge, 823 F.2d 395; Glasgow v.
Peatross, 201 Va. 43, 109 S.E.2d 135 (1959) (oral contract to furnish room and board for 15 months
not within the Statute of Frauds because the contract was terminable upon the death of the promisee).
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should reasonably expect would induce the promisee to act upon
it, and that does induce such action, is enforceable notwithstanding
the Statute of Frauds. 76 The employee can often show reliance

through evidence of moving to a new location or leaving prior
employment. The third and least common method for avoiding the
requirement of a written contract has been to show that the oral
inducement and the failure to abide by it were part of a fraudulent
scheme.

77

Beyond the enforcement of oral promises, the courts have been

receptive to finding implied and explicit contracts in nontraditional
documents. This tendency is best reflected in the cases finding

promises of job security upon good performance in personnel policies and employee handbooks. Typically, such promises are located in procedures for progressive discipline (if there are no
substantive limits on discipline, then why have procedures?), enumerated grounds for discipline, as well as explicit promises of continued employment upon good performance or unless just cause
for discharge arises. "[A] promise of job security contained in an
employee handbook distributed by an employer to its employees
constitutes an offer for a unilateral contract; and an employee's
continuing to work, while under no obligation to do so, constitutes
an acceptance and sufficient consideration to make the employer's
78
promise binding and enforceable."
The final contract theory of recovery in employment discharge
cases is the most expansive and potentially the most important.
76. E.g., Everett v. Brown, 321 S.E.2d 685 (V. Va. 1984); REsTATEMIENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1981).
77. E.g., Everett, 321 S.E.2d 685; Ross v. Midelburg, 129 W. Va. 851, 42 S.E.2d 185 (1947)
(land sale contract).
78. Cook v. Heck's, Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453, 459 (W. Va. 1986). Accord Leikvold v. Valley View
Commun. Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170 (1984); Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber Corp.,
655 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1983); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880
(1980); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Woolley v. Hoffman-La
Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443
N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982); Small v. Springs Indus., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452 (1987);
Ferraro v. Koelsch, 124 Wis. 2d 154, 368 N.V.2d 666 (1985); Mobil Coal Prod. Inc. v. Parks, 704
P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985). See generally Decker, Handbooks and Employment Policies as Binding Commitments After 'Banas', 7 J. OF L. & CoM. 103 (1987); Johnston & Taylor, Employee Handbooks:
A Selective Survey of Emerging Developments, 11 EMpLOYEE REL. L.J. 225 (1985); Note, Employment
Handbooks and Employment at Will Contracts, 1985 DuKE L.J. 196; 33 A.L.R.4th 120 (1984).
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This theory, the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, has also spilled over into tort theories and not inconse-

quentially into tort damages. The cause of action begins with the
unchallenged assumption that every employment relationship is

based on a contract. ("You come work for me and I'll pay you
$X.00 an hour.") Under current doctrine and unless otherwise
specified, the contract is terminable by either party at any time.

But, like every other contract, it is also subject to the implied
covenant to execute its provisions in good faith.7 9 Several juris-

dictions have found that an employer's unwarranted termination
of the employment contract may, at least in certain circumstances,
violate that duty. Thus far, the cases fall into three general categories.

The first, and the most narrow, is the rule in New Hampshire,
whose 1974 decision in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. 0 was the earliest application of the duty of good faith and fair dealing to the

employment context. The Monge Court recognized a cause of action for a woman who alleged she was fired for refusing to date

her foreman, characterizing his motivation and the discharge as
in bad faith. The opinion was written in broad terms and seemed

79. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 205. "Every contract imposes upon each party a
duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement." Comment a to Section
205 states:
The phrase 'good faith' is used in a variety of contexts, and its meaning varies somewhat
with the context. Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of
the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving 'bad
faith' because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness. The
appropriate remedy for a breach of the duty of good faith also varies with the circumstances.
Comment d adds:
Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith in performance even though
the actor believes his conduct to be justified. But the obligation goes further: bad faith
may be overt or may consist of inaction, and fair dealing may require more than honesty.
A complete catalogue of the types of bad faith is impossible, but the following types are
among those which have been recognized in judicial decisions: evasions of the spirit of the
bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance,
abuse of a power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other
party's performance.
80. Monge, 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549.
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to hold that any bad faith termination would be actionable. Sub-

sequently, however, New Hampshire qualified the Monge rule to
require the plaintiff to prove: (1) the defendant was motivated by

bad faith, malice, or retaliation; and (2) the retaliation resulted
from the employee's performance of an act encouraged by public
policy or refusal to do an act condemned by public policy. 8 As

such, the New Hampshire law now mimics the retaliatory discharge
tort.
The second category has also undergone a narrowing. In For-

tune v. National Cash Register,82 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that an employee with forty years of service stated
a claim for relief in his allegations that his employer had discharged him to avoid paying him a $92,000 commission he had
earned on a five million dollar sale. The employer, said the court,
had denied the plaintiff a benefit he reasonably expected was guaranteed by his employment relationship. Subsequent Massachusetts
decisions have restated the doctrine to require the plaintiff to prove

his discharge would unjustly enrich the employer by depriving the
plaintiff of money that he had fairly earned and legitimately ex-

pected. 83 Arizona has also adopted this qualification on the em84
ployer's discretion.

81. Cloutier, 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140; Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414
A.2d 1273 (1980).
82. Fortune v. National Cash Register, 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
83. Kravetz v. Merchants Distrib. Inc., 387 Mass. 457, 440 N.E.2d 1278 (1982); Maddaloni v.
Western Mass. Bus Lines, 386 Mass. 877, 438 N.E.2d 351 (1982); Siles v. Travenol Laborat. Inc.,
13 Mass. App. 354, 433 N.E.2d 103 (1982). Massachusetts also recognizes the public policy/retaliatory
discharge tort action. See Stepanischen, 722 F.2d 922.
Massachusetts has thus effectively adopted the approach advocated by Professor Krauskopf in
her article, Employment Discharge: Survey and Critique of the Modern Employment at Will Rule,
51 U. Mo. K"J. Crn, L. REv. 189 (1983). She would recognize a wrongful discharge action in two
circumstances: (1) when the discharge is motivated by purposes ulterior to the employment, which
would subsume the "public policy" tort and cases like Monge and (2) when "the discharge is motivated
by a purpose to deny expectations which the parties had in entering the particular employment contract."
Id. at 215.
84. Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. 370, 385, 710 P.2d 1025, 1040:
IThe covenant of good faith and fair dealing] protects the right of the parties to an agreement
to receive the benefits of the agreement that they have entered into. The denial of a party's
right to those benefits, whatever they are, will breach the duty of good faith implicit in
the contract. Thus, the relevant inquiry always will focus on the contract itself, to determine
what the parties did agree to.
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The Massachusetts and New Hampshire approaches are obviously cautious and limited. Other states, however, have imposed
on employers a duty of good faith and fair dealing that more

significantly restricts their discretion to discharge workers. California courts have led the way. Taking a hint from the state's
supreme court,8 5 Cleary v. American Airlines,86 held the substantial

length (eighteen years) of an employee's service, together with the
employer's expressly provided procedures for adjudicating em-

ployee disputes, imposed a just cause limitation on the employer's
ability to discharge the employee. The "termination of employ-

ment without legal cause after such a period of time offends the
implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained
in all contracts, including employment contracts.1 8 7 Under that

covenant, neither party may do anything to injure the rights of
the other.
Following Cleary, the California courts of appeals have elaborated on the employer's duty and held the combination of facts

in Cleary was not a prerequisite to finding a breach but was only

85. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d 167, 179, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, n.12. The footnote
observed that the court's conclusion that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for a common
law wrongful discharge made it "unnecessary to determine whether a tort recovery would additionally
be available ... on the theory that Arco's discharge constituted a breach of implied-at-law covenant
of good faith and fair dealing inherent in every contract." The court also noted that other jurisdictions
(New Hampshire and Massachusetts) had applied the theory to employment terminations and that
"past California cases have held that a breach of this implied-at-law covenant sounds in tort as well

as in contract." Id.
86. Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722.
87. Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. Accord Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d
311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
Montana's supreme court endorsed the Cleary perception of the good faith and fair dealing
covenant when it held the employer must show just cause to justify an employment discharge if there
were present "objective manifestations" that would lead the employee to reasonably believe he or
she had job security. Dare v. Montana Petrol. Mktg. Co., 687 P.2d 1015, 1020 (Mont. 1984). Accord
Flanigan v. Prudential Fed. S. & L., 720 P.2d 257, 261-62 (Mont. 1986) (just cause required to fire
employee if the facts gave her "a clear and objective basis for believing that, if her work was satisfactorily performed, her employment would continue"). In both of those cases, the "objective"
facts relied upon by the court to hold the employee could not be discharged without just cause included
an unblemished work record, no warnings of problems, regular pay raises and promotions, and most importantly - long term employment. Flanigan hints, too, that long term employment, by itself,
may be enough to vest job security rights.
The Montana decisions have been superseded by statute. See infra, note 109.
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illustrative. 88 Relying on a California Supreme Court decision regarding the obligations of parties to a commercial contract, 89 the
appellate courts have evolved a standard that finds a breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing "whenever the employer engages in bad faith action extraneous to the contract, combined with the obligor's intent to frustrate the [employee's]
enjoyment of contract rights." 90 Koehrer v. Superior Court9 explained application of the duty to the employment context:
If the employer merely disputes his liability under the contract by asserting in
good faith and with probable cause that good cause existed for discharge, the
implied covenant is not violated and the employer is not liable in tort ...
If, however, the existence of good cause for discharge is asserted by the employer without probable cause and in bad faith, that is, without a good faith
belief that good cause for discharge in fact exists, the employer has tortiously
attempted to deprive the employee of the benefits of the agreement, and an
action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing will
lie.92

This does not impose a general just cause requirement; an employer may be mistaken about an employee's wrongdoing or inadequate performance but can still avoid liability if the employer
can prove it fairly believed there was a legitimate reason for the
discharge. If the employer lacked a reasonable basis for its belief
or if motivated by an irrelevant or illegitimate purpose, then it
has breached the covenant. Of course, if the employee is longterm and the employer has promised procedural protections, then
under Cleary the employer must establish just cause in fact.

88. "The facts in Cleary establish only one manner among which an employer might violate
this covenant." Gray v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 813, 821, 226 Cal. Rptr. 570, 574 (1986);
Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 262, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860, 867 (1985). Accord
Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 478-79, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 619
(1984); Crosier v. United Parcel Serv., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 1137-38, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361, 364-65
(1983).
89. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206
Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
90. Gray, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 821, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 574; Khanna, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 262,
215 Cal. Rptr. at 867; Shapiro, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 478-79, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19. But see Foley,
174 Cal. App. 3d 282, 219 Cal. Rptr. 866, rev. granted, Cal. App. 3d , 222 Cal. Rptr. 740, 712
P.2d 891 .(1986).
91. Koehrer, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss2/2
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California and the jurisdictions using its analysis regarding the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing allow for the full array
of tort damages for breach of the covenant.9 3 Thus, prevailing
employees can recover not only backpay and back benefits, but
also emotional distress and punitive damages.

II. THE

CALL TO

DIscARD

THE AT-WImL DOCTRUNE

As is obvious from the foregoing overview, the at-will doctrine
is reeling. In every jurisdiction, federal and state statutes have
invalidated a variety of employer motives; many state courts have
added common law proscriptions against retaliatory discharges;
courts have generously construed contract law and juries have
searched hard to find employer promises of job security; and some
states have used the good faith requirement to scrutinize the reasonableness of every employee discharge. The exceptions are becoming the rule; yet they have so far produced a crazy-quilt of
claims for relief that only haphazardly includes and excludes unjustly discharged workers from the winners' circle. Thus, in the
scheme of common law evolution, it is time to reassess the rule.
Just as the law of products liability grafted exceptions onto the
requirement of privity until at last a new rule emerged, 94 or as
changes in conflicts of law doctrine eroded away outmoded rules, 95
so too employment law has evolved to the point that the tattered
at-will doctrine must give way to a rule better suited to present
needs and notions of fairness.
The bases for the at-will rule, if they ever existed, have now
clearly lapsed. Its premise in the facile logic of mutuality - i.e.,
because the employee can terminate the contract at any time, the
employer should also have that right - has no fair application in

93. E.g., Koehrer, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 1170, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 829; Flanigan, 720 P.2d 257.
See Annotation, Damagesfor Wrongful Dischargeof At-Will Employees, 44 A.L.R.4T 1131 (1986).
94. As Judge Cardozo stated in holding an automobile manufacturer liable despite the absence
of privity, "[pirecedents from the days of travel by stagecoach do not fit the conditions of travel
today. The principle that the danger must be imminent does not change, but the things subject to
the principle do change. They are whatever the needs of life in a developing civilization require them
to be." MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 391, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
95. E.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963); Auten
v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
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the modern employment context. As courts have already recognized in construing anti-discrimination laws, a rule of superficial
96
equality can often impose a drastically discriminatory impact.
Indeed, the mutuality argument is reminiscent of Anatole France's
reference to "the majestic equality of the law, which forbids rich
and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets,
and to steal bread."' 97 The impact on the modern corporate employer from the loss of an employee hardly compares to the personal impact felt by an employee who is suddenly out of a job.
While an employer hit with the departure of an at-will worker may
lose some investment it made in providing the employee with training or experience, the discharged employee faces severe financial
and emotional crises. The obvious loss of income causes an abrupt
decline in life style for the worker's family. Loss of medical benfits
can threaten the family's health. Typically, the employee suffers
a substantial blow to his or her self-esteem, sense of worth, and
emotional well-being. The worker experiences stress about finances
and anxiety about the uncertain prospects of finding new employment in what is often a hostile market, especially for one stigmatized by termination. These emotional strains, as much as the
financial losses, also redound to the detriment of the employee's
family.
The philosophical and economic bases for the at-will rule have
been eroded, if not washed away. The doctrine developed in the
late nineteenth century, a period dominated by natural law concepts of property and freedom of contract, laissezfaireeconomics,
and great industrial expansion.9 8 The prevailing natural law con-

96. E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971). Courts have also acknowledged that, at times, the law must "discriminate" - accord
favors or draw distinctions - in order to achieve a meaningful equality. E.g., Fullilove v. Klutznik,
448 U.S. 448 (1980); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Douglas v.
California, 37Z U.S. 353 (1963); Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correc. Serv., 628 F.2d 796
(2d Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980 (1981).
97. A. FRANCE, LE Lys Rouoa, Ch. 7 (1894), quoted in TH OxroRD DICTONARY oF QuoTAT ONs 217 (3d ed. 1980).

98. See Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. at 375, 710 P.2d at 1030; Hermann & Sor, supra note 3. The
source of the at-will rule apparently was the 1877 Wood treatise, quoted in supra note 1, which "cited
as authority four cases, none of which supported [the rule]." Summers, supra note 3, at 485 n.20
(citing Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. Ray. 335, 341 (1974)).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss2/2
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cepts vested in the employer the right to do with his property as
he pleased. His property included his business, and his business
included his employees. Any governmental intrusion into his business relations with employees, then, violated basic notions of property. 99 The freedom of contract, which purportedly extended to
both employer and employee, protected the parties' "right" to deal
with each other at arm's length. 00 To externally impose a limitation on either party's ability to terminate the contract would
violate that freedom. The freedom for employees, of course, was
illusory; all the bargaining power rested with management.
Today, the philosophy that gave preeminence to the property
interests of employers has lost out to a recognition of the inequalities and social costs it produced.' 0' To be sure, we have not
entirely rejected property entitlements in the operation of a business.10 2 We have, nevertheless, admitted that employees build certain job expectations akin (if not equivalent) to property rights.
Workers perceive an entitlement to continue their employment so
long as they perform well and there is work to do. 10 3 These expectations have risen to the level of legally recognized interests in
court decisions protecting the interests of individuals to pursue
their chosen profession, 10 4 preserving the vested rights of workers

99. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (striking down state legislation prohibiting "yellow dog" contracts); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (striking down federal law forbidding
dismissal of employees because of their union membership).
100. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
101. See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941), overruling Coppage, 236
U.S. 1 and Adair, 208 U.S. 161; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), overruling Hammer
v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Vest Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), overruling
Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Section I-A (canvassing modern regulatory laws
limiting employer discretion).
102. E.g., Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1740 (1987) (employer was entitled to
due process procedural protections in a government ordered reinstatement of a discharged employee);
Kisner v. Public Serv. Dist., 163 W. Va. 565, 258 S.E.2d 586 (1979).
103. See Gould, The Idea of the Job as Property in Contemporary America: The Legal and
Collective BargainingFramework, 1986 B.Y.U. L. Ray. 885; Hermann & Sor, supra note 3, at 767.
104. E.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (government violates employees' property rights if it dismisses them in such a way as to jeopardize their future career opportunities);
WVinner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (state cannot deny application for
bar admission without a due process hearing); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232
(1957)(state cannot stigmatize individual in a way that will prevent him from pursuing his chosen
occupation); Major, 169 W. Va. at 251-57, 286 S.E.2d at 695-98.
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in their seniority systems, 05 and acknowledging the entitlement of
long-term employees to just cause protection from discharge. 0 6
Economic conditions, too, have changed drastically since development of the at-will doctrine. Employment today involves a
high degree of specialization, tight job markets, limited interchangeability of jobs and job skills, a corresponding increase in
the difficulty of acquiring new job skills, and concentrated economic power in large corporations. These realities raise the stakes
for employees faced with unemployment. It is time, therefore, to
do away with the remnants of the at-will doctrine and recognize
a right in all nonprobationary employees to a job subject only to
termination for just cause.
Employers would have no legitimate basis to complain of this
right for their employees. Beyond the desire to resurrect outdated
notions of property and to maintain some sort of in terrorem power
over their workers, employers have no reason to insist on the right
to willy-nilly fire people and jeopardize their well-being and that
of their families. A fair, rational employer would not want to fire
an employee in the absence of a legitimate business purpose. Indeed, by ensuring competent employees are not mistakenly dismissed, employers improve their personnel practices and help to
sustain an effective workforce. By offering job security, employers
take away a major incentive for good employees to go elsewhere
and in that way mitigate any possible unfairness that might result
from the loss of "mutuality" in terminating employment relationships. Meanwhile, the statutory and public policy interests described in Part I, above, could be better implemented; employees
claiming discrimination would not be put to the test of proving
the elusive illicit motive; and employers would find it more difficult to stifle or chill employees' exercise of statutory or constitutional rights or their satisfaction of a civic duty.

105. E.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Firefighters Local 1784 v.

Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); United States v. Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(h).
106. See Flanigan, 720 P.2d at 261; Dare, 687 P.2d 1015; Petersen v. First Fed. S. & L., 617
F. Supp. 1039 (D. V.I. 1985).
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This is not a revolutionary notion.107 After all, civil service and

school tenure systems protect most of our government employees
and collective bargaining agreements assure just cause safeguards

to the unionized sector of our workforce. Thus, counting only
public and organized employees, a large percentage of our pop-

ulation already works under some just cause umbrella. Moreover,
and not to be discounted, nearly every other industrialized country
besides the United States today guarantees workers protection
against unwarranted discharges. 108 Yet the public employment, unionized, and foreign systems have all managed quite well, even
with the burden of fair treatment of employees. At least one Amer-

ican state, Montana, has also enacted legislation providing job
security for its workforce. 10 9
107. Numerous commentators have urged repeal of the at-will doctrine and implementation of
some alternative scheme. E.g., Gould, supra note 103; Memmemeier, Protectionfrom Unjust Discharges: An ArbitrationScheme, 19 HARV. J. ON LEois, 49 (1982); Peck, Some Kind of Hearingfor
Persons Dischargedfrom Private Employment, 16 SAN DIEo L. REV. 313 (1979); Platt, supra note
3; Prince, A Modest Proposal: The Statutory "No-Cause" Alternative to Wrongful Discharge, 24
SAN DIEo L. Rav. 137 (1987); St. Antoine, You're Fired!, 10 Hums. RTs. 32 (1982); Summers, supra
note 3; Note, Employment At-Will: Just Cause Protection Through Mandatory Arbitration, 62 WAsH.
L. REv. 151 (1987).
108. See Hermann & Sor, supra note 3, at 804-12; Summers, supra note 3, at 508-19. The
prevailing international standard is that propounded in June 1982 by the International Labor Organization (ILO), when it adopted the Convention and Recommendation on Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer. Article 4 provides:
The employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a valid reason for such
termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment, or service.
This statement reiterates the principle the ILO first adopted (by a vote of 196-14) in 1963 in Recommendation No. 119 Concerning Termination of Employment of the Initiative of the Employer.
Summers, supra note 3, at 508. (The ILO is an agency in the United Nations.)
109. Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (July 1, 1987), 9A Individ. Emp. Rts.
Manual, Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 567:4-567:7. Section 4 of the Act sets out the scope of the protection:
SECTION 4 ELEmNTs OF WRONGFUL DisCHARGE. A discharge is wrongful only if:
(1) It was in retaliation for the employee's refusal to violate public policy or for reporting a violation of public policy; or
(2) The discharge was not for good cause and the employee had completed the employer's probationary period of employment; or
(3) The employer violated the express provisions of its own written personnel policy.
Subsections (I) and (3) codify the common law, but Subsection (2) extends employee protections
beyond what the Montana Supreme Court had done. See Flanigan, 720 P.2d 257; supra note 87.
That extension was probably in exchange for limitations placed on damages by § 5 of the Act.
Wrongfully discharged employees are limited by that provision to lost wages less mitigation and, if
employer fraud or actual malice is proved by clear and convincing evidence, to punitive damages.
Apparently, the legislation was provoked by the $1.5 million verdict the plaintiff-bank teller received
in Flanigan, 720 P.2d 257.
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What life after the at-will rule should look like is the subject
of Part III.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR A GENERAL JUST CAUSE PROTECTION
While employers have no legitimate interest in retaining the
right to unjustly fire an employee, they do have valid, substantial
interests in maintaining a dependable workforce and avoiding both
extended litigation1 and the threat of six- or seven-figure verdicts."' Employees, on the other hand, have substantial interests
in a procedure that provides a fast, affordable remedy for a wrongful discharge and in a system that does not leave their job security
to the whim of the employer or the happenstance of current employment termination law. A procedure that would efficiently address a discharge's validity would permit unfairly fired workers to
escape the severe economic and emotional crunch described in Part
II. The solution, then, lies in establishing an alternative system,
analogous to arbitration in the collective bargaining context, that
would cover most all employees.
To implement this system, employees should be accorded a cause
of action sounding in tort, complete with the full range of legal
and equitable remedies," 2 for any discharge accomplished without
just cause. Employers, however, should be able to raise as a qualified defense the offer, or actual results, of an arbitration procedure that meets certain minimum standards. The employer can,
in effect, choose to buy the insurance of arbitration or run the
risks of expensive litigation and a sizeable verdict.
Elaboration of this qualified defense should track in part development of the law relating to arbitration in the collective bar110. Employers have a realistic fear that establishing a tort for discharges without just cause

could open the floodgates and correspondingly interfere with legitimate management needs. Fired
employees feel a deep, emotional injury; the termination threatens their sense of self-worth, perhaps
their raison d'etre, as well as their livelihood. In such circumstances, people naturally look for some

explanation for their predicament other than their own deficiencies. Thus, even when an employer
acts with good cause in discharging an employee, the employer runs a higher risk of potential litigation
than in other contexts.
111. See supra note 109.
112. That is, the remedies should include not only compensation for economic losses, but also
damages for emotional distress and humiliation, punitive damages, back seniority, reinstatement, and
corrective or prohibitory injunctions.
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gaining process. 1 '3 "Just cause" is a term of art and has been welldelineated in arbitration law. 114 Analogies could also be drawn to

civil service and other statutory descriptions of just cause. Certainly, the term encompasses inadequate performance, misconduct,

and economic necessity. An arbitrator's decision, or the offer of
arbitration, 5 should bar the employee's tort recovery so long as
the procedure is fair and meets the standards specified below.

To be adequate, the arbitration procedure must include:
(1) An opportunity for a full and fair hearing before an arbitrator who is
provided by the government; (b) selected by agreement of the employee,
representative, and the employer; or (c) selected by a neutral person or
ganization that is agreed upon by the employee, his representative, and
employer and that is familiar with arbitration.

(a)
his
orthe

(2) Provision for the employer to absorb the costs of the procedure, including
fees for the arbitrator, the employee's attorney or other representative, and
any expert witnesses.
(3) Discretion in the arbitrator to award partial or complete relief analogous
to the make-whole remedies in arbitration law and under Title VII,116 including
reinstatement, backpay, back benefits, and back seniority.
(4) Formal and timely written notice to the employee providing not only the
reasons for the discharge but also a description of the full range of rights
available to the employee and specifically including notice of the right to engage
an attorney (or, at the employee's election, some other representative) whose
fee will be paid by the employer and to have the representative join in the
selection of the arbitrator.

Those elements require some explanation.
(1) Impartiality of the Arbitrator. It is essential that the employee and his representative participate in the selection of the

arbitrator or that the selection be made by an agreed-upon third
113. The defense and procedure proposed here are similar to the framework established by the
Montana legislature in its Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, § 9 (July 1,1987). See supra
note 109, at 567:6.
114. See, e.g., F. ELKoURI & E. ELKoTrIu, How ARBrrATiON WoRKs 650-707 (4th ed. 1985).
See also Summers, supra note 3, at 499-508.
115. The employee, of course, can waive the right to arbitrate and, consequently, any claim
against the employer. But he should not be permitted to elect between a court action and arbitration.
The right to make such an election would defeat the purpose of providing for an arbitration defense.
§ 706(g),
VII of
Civil Rights
Act of 1964,
116. Title
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party, such as a government agency or the American Arbitration
Association. If the employer retains full discretion to appoint the
arbitrators, the risk is excessive that those decision-makers would
become "in-house" accommodators of the party who chooses and
pays them. In addition, the representative should be included in
the selection process because the employee is unlikely to know
anything about the candidates. In arbitrations under collective bargaining agreements, the unions provide the expertise; but for atwill employees, that help is unavailable. Thus, the at-will employee
must turn to his hired representative, who presumably would be
an attorney with experience in arbitration and employment law.
(2) Costs to be Paid by the Employer. Without a provision for
employer absorption of the costs of the hearing, discharged employees could be deterred from pursuing arbitation.117 Attorneys'
fees must be provided because the small amount of backpay ordinarily available would make it extremely difficult for the employee to find an attorney to handle the arbitration on a contingency
basis. Effectively forcing the employee who wants a lawyer to engage one on an hourly basis would discourage already unemployed
workers from pursuing their arbitration remedy. Thus, in any nonfrivolous case in which there is no labor organization to represent
the employee or pay for his representation, the employer should
be responsible for the worker's attorney's fee. In any event, the
employer would still have less expense than it would incur defending against a tort action.
(3) Remedies. The object of the arbitrator's remedial powers
would be to make the wronged employee whole, to put him or
her where he or she would have been but for the erroneous dismissal. Because of the accelerated decisional process and the makewhole relief, there is not as great a need for damages to compensate the employee for emotional distress. And because of the
general application of a just cause requirement, the need would
be reduced to provide the deterrent of punitive damages against
employers' conduct violating public policy. In addition, and re117. Of course, if the employees are represented by a union, then the employer could insist the
costs of arbitration.

union - as opposed to the grieving employee - split the
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gardless of the arbitration's result, expeditious resolution of the
dispute benefits both the employee and the employer. The employee can either seek other work as soon as possible or regain
his lost wages and his job. Correspondingly, the employer can
proceed to hire a replacement or arrange reinstatement without
extended disruption of personnel management needs.
(4) Notice. Obviously, any fair procedure requires notice to the
employee of the reasons for the discharge. Just as important, however, for the system to be fair and effective, the employer must
fully inform the employee about the availability of counsel and
of arbitration. This information must be provided at the time of
termination, and an employer who fails to give the requisite notice
cannot claim the arbitration defense. In return, employers can require the worker to request arbitration within a relatively brief
period of time.
An exception to this just cause protection should be made for
probationary employees. An employer may legitimately require an
evaluation period as a means for selecting employees for permanent hiring and achieving the best possible workforce. Thus, during or at the end of probation the employer may release individuals
without the same demonstration of just cause as would be required
for permanent employees. For this exception to apply, the employer should establish a formalized program including notice of
the probationary status to the employees and a specific, reasonable
duration for the probationary status. In addition, of course, the
employer would continue to be limited by fair employment and
other labor laws.
The just cause requirment for employment discharges and the
necessary, attendant procedures can be implemented either judicially or legislatively. The at-will doctrine was one of judicial creation, and like every such common law rule, it is equally subject
to judicial abolition. As demonstrated, the law has already riddled
the doctrine with so many exceptions as to render its random operation totally arbitrary.
The legitimacy of judicial action, however, does not deny the
desirability of a legislative solution. Legislative treatment, of course,
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offers the chance for a more sweeping, comprehensive change.
Most importantly, action by the legislature could produce both
alternatives to private arbitration and measures to mitigate the
procedure's costs. The state could, for example, create a labor
board to hear discharge cases or expand the jurisdiction of an
equal opportunities commission to hear the cases. At least partial
funding for these government-run arbitration boards could be derived from the taxing of costs against employers who appear before
them. It would also be fair to impose an across-the-board fee on
all nonunion employees 18 in the state to help fund the state-provided arbitration. Since that would be the group to benefit most
from such legislation, asking its members to spread some of the
costs among themselves makes sense.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The common law doctrine of at-will employment, which allows
employers to fire employees for any reason or no reason, has outlived its usefulness, if it ever had any. The numerous legislative
and judicial qualifications to the rule have already greatly reduced
it. Yet those reforms have also left the remnants to operate in a
wholly arbitrary fashion. There is no reason or policy to allow
employers to retain the in terrorem power over employees to discharge them for any reason. Such power leaves workers fearful
of exercising valuable rights that might offend their bosses and
violates fundamental concepts regarding the essential worth of every
individual.
The alternative of a tort action for wrongful discharge, however, would be too costly for both employers and employees, would
cause unwanted delay in resolving issues of great importance to
the parties, and would threaten to clog already overcrowded court
dockets. Courts and legislatures should therefore adopt, as a defense to tort actions, a decision by an arbitrator or an employer's
118. Unionized employees already pay, through their union dues, for just cause protection and
the rights to grieve discharges and to representation in that process. Focusing the fees for a stateprovided arbitration process on nonunion employers and employees would diminish the possible setbacks that unions might ironically suffer by adoption of such employee-protective legislation.
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offer of arbitration if the available procedure satisfies certain prerequisites. Those include the selection of an agreed-upon neutral
arbitrator and a right of counsel, with the costs of nonfrivolous
cases to be absorbed by the employer or the government. A full
array of make-whole remedies and complete notice to discharged
employees of their rights should also be required. Employers who
do not provide the option of an adequate arbitration procedure
should remain liable in tort for discharges made without just cause.
An exception could be made for probationary employees.
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